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International Trade Law and the
“Carbon Leakage” Problem:
Are Unilateral U.S. Import Restrictions the Solution?
by Bernd G. Janzen*

A

Introduction

t the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Bali, Indonesia, negotiators overcame
tremendous differences to agree on a “Bali Roadmap”
process intended to determine a successor to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”),1 whose current commitments to reduce
global greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions expire in 2012.2 While
the United States rejected the
Kyoto Protocol,3 there appear to
be decent prospects that it will
join its post-2012 successor.4
Among other ambitious
goals, the Bali Roadmap process, through the “Bali Action
Plan” agreement, calls for the
development of both national
and international measures to
mitigate climate change, based
on a “shared vision for longterm cooperative action.” 5
However, reflecting a deep rift
between developed and developing countries, the Bali Action
Plan prescribes “common but
differentiated responsibilities”6
in which developed countries
commit to quantified and verifiable GHG emission reductions, but developing countries are only required to contribute
“appropriate mitigation actions . . . in the context of sustainable
development.”7 In short, under the Bali Roadmap, only developed countries must actually reduce GHG emissions.
This core doctrine of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the Bali Roadmap may have been politically indispensable to reaching agreement in Bali, but it has substantial
complicating implications for international trade in goods and
the competitiveness of U.S. industries. The problem, in a phrase,
is “carbon leakage.”8 If developed economies like the United
States and EU impose higher costs on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
and other GHG emissions (the economic consequence of setting and tightening caps on such emissions) than do developing
countries, one result will be an incentive to shift GHG-intensive

manufacturing from the former to the latter. This could lead to
the reduction of such production in developed countries and an
increase in exports of GHG-intensive goods from developing
to developed countries.9 In the context of China’s massive and
growing trade surpluses and its emergence as the world’s largest emitter of CO2,10 lawmakers in the United States and other
developed countries face a tricky challenge—how to proceed
with the urgent task of imposing
meaningful national curbs on
GHG emissions while ensuring
that domestic industries are not
disadvantaged by imports produced pursuant to less onerous
emissions requirements.
In the United States, unilateral trade restrictions appear
to be emerging as a mechanism
of choice as Congress evaluates its options for legislating a
solution to the carbon leakage
problem. However, it is far from
clear if the trade restrictions
under consideration comply
or conflict with current global
trading rules under the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”).
Such restrictions also do not
appear to mesh well with U.S.
trade policy, which generally
favors trade liberalization. Unilaterally imposed national trade restrictions would also, at first
blush, appear inconsistent with the goal established in the Bali
Action Plan of a globally coordinated approach to the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions. This Article examines the most
visible proposed legislative solution to carbon leakage currently
under consideration in the United States in light of WTO rules,
U.S. trade policy, and the multilateral goals espoused in the Bali
Action Plan. This Article also proposes that current U.S. trade
remedy laws provide a useful analogy for understanding and
addressing the concerns of domestic manufacturing industries as
they grapple with the carbon leakage problem.

In the United States,
unilateral trade
restrictions appear to be
emerging as a mechanism
of choice as Congress
evaluates its options
for legislating a solution
to the carbon
leakage problem.
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Regulating U.S. Imports to Ensure
Fair Competition
Of the various recent legislative proposals that would reduce
U.S. emissions of GHGs, the most prominent is the America’s
Climate Security Act of 2007 (“ACSA”), introduced by Senators
Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner (R-VA) on October 18,
2007.11 ACSA would establish a national emissions cap on six
GHGs, including CO2, which would decline from 2012 through
2050,12 and would institute mechanisms to allocate emissions
allowances to a range of covered U.S. GHG-emitting industries.13 Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced ACSA in the
Senate two months prior to the release of the Bali Action Plan,
and the ACSA is not expressly tied to that multilateral process.
However, both measures are a clear reflection of the strong political will in the United States
and in many other countries to
move quickly and in a globally
coordinated fashion to reduce
GHG emissions and stave off
the worst expected effects of
climate change.
Recognizing the adverse
competitive effects that could
result to U.S. manufacturing
industries competing against
foreign industries not subject
to such measures—i.e., the carbon leakage problem—ACSA
would require the Administration to urge other countries to
adopt comparable measures to
reduce GHG emissions.14 Otherwise, U.S. industries would
have systemically higher compliance costs than their foreign competitors—and such an
imbalance would only increase
over time as U.S. emissions
caps decline. But also recognizing that a globally coordinated
approach to reducing GHG emissions may or may not occur,
ACSA would, as of 2020, require importers of GHG-intensive
products to declare to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) either that: (1) the imported goods are covered by special international allowances created under ACSA,15 or (2) the
exporting country is one deemed under ACSA to have taken
measures to reduce GHG emissions comparable to those taken
by the United States.16 The import provisions expressly cover
GHG-intensive manufactured goods such as iron, steel, aluminum, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and would extend to any
manufacturing production process that generates GHG emissions “comparable” to the expressly covered products.17 Thus,
ACSA has the obvious potential to impose very substantial
compliance costs on U.S. importers of a wide range of manufactured goods, and seems certain to alter the competitive balance
between U.S. and foreign firms supplying ACSA-covered goods

to the U.S. market. While these added import compliance costs
(in essence, constituting a trade restriction) would be justified
from the U.S. perspective as attempting to restore the competitive balance of U.S. industries harmed by imports from countries with less stringent emissions restrictions, it seems unlikely
that U.S. trading partners would willingly accept such unilateral
import restrictions.
ACSA’s import restrictions are not the only type of mechanism under consideration as the U.S. Congress examines how
to address competitive disadvantages to U.S. industries resulting from the carbon leakage problem. The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce identified
two other possible mechanisms to address the competitiveness
concerns for U.S. industry associated with carbon leakage in a
widely cited January 2008 White
Paper.18 One is the adoption of
carbon intensity standards for
energy-intensive products, which
would apply to all such products
sold in the United States regardless of their origin.19 Fees would
presumably be imposed on products that do not meet those carbon
intensity standards, to compel
the sale in the United States of
only those products that do meet
those standards.20 The American
Iron and Steel Institute and the
Steel Manufacturers Association
are major proponents of carbon
intensity standards, and have
criticized the proposed ACSA
import mechanism for, among
other things, encouraging foreign
governments to provide subsidies
to their exporters to the United
States of greenhouse gas-intensive goods.21
The third possible option for addressing carbon leakage
identified in the White Paper would make foreign countries’
access to U.S. carbon markets contingent on their imposition of
GHG emissions restrictions comparable to those adopted in the
United States.22 Such incentives could take several forms, such
as more generous terms of access for countries that agree more
quickly to emissions caps comparable to those imposed in the
United States.23 However, import restrictions along the lines of
those proposed by ACSA, while contentious, are generally seen
at this point as having the best chances of passage in the U.S.
Congress.
The EU is also contemplating unilateral trade measures that
could restrict imports as part of its ambitious drive to reduce
carbon emissions across a wide range of industries by twenty
percent by 2020.24 While no such import measure is currently
in effect, EU leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy
and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso have

The EU is also
contemplating unilateral
trade measures that could
restrict imports as part of
its ambitious drive
to reduce carbon emissions
across a wide range
of industries by twenty
percent by 2020.
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repeatedly referred to the possibility of imposing a carbon tax
or allowance requirement (similar to the scheme contemplated
by ACSA) on imports from countries not in compliance with
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements (i.e., the United
States).25 These suggestions have drawn strong criticism from
U.S. trade officials, who warn that such proposals could facilitate WTO-inconsistent trade protectionism under the guise of
environmental protection.26
Notably, the recent proposed directives of the European
Commission that form the centerpiece of the ambitious EU climate change package do not, with certain limited exceptions,
impose restrictions on imports.27 However, the economic burden
of the carbon leakage problem is potentially just as acute for EU
industries as it is for U.S. industries. It therefore seems inevitable
that the EU will eventually need to contemplate some scheme
akin to the ACSA import restrictions to address the competitiveness concerns of its carbon-intensive industries as emissions
restrictions begin to increase production costs. Indeed, European steelmakers recently threatened to delay expansion plans in
Europe pending EU adoption of appropriate measures to account
for the competitive impact of carbon-intensive imports.28

Testing ACSA’s Import Provisions Under the
WTO and U.S. Trade Policy
The trade provisions of ACSA clearly raise the question of
U.S. compliance with obligations under the WTO. The question of WTO compliance has been at the forefront of Congress’
consideration of ACSA’s import measures.29 The debate potentially implicates many aspects of the WTO Agreements, but
centers around two core concepts: (1) the “national treatment”
principle of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”), which, in essence, obligates WTO Members
to ensure that imported goods are subjected to regulatory and
tax treatment no more burdensome than the treatment to which
the same goods, produced domestically, are subjected;30 and (2)
the GATT Article XX defense, which allows WTO Members
to take discriminatory action against imports where “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”—but only
where such action does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” 31 or represent a disguised trade restriction.32
GATT Article XX, the plain language of which does not seem
to perfectly capture the concerns surrounding GHG emissions,
is as close as the WTO Agreements come to permitting trade
restrictions based on climate change mitigation.33 It remains
unclear—and the source of considerable concern—whether U.S.
laws such as ACSA would be vulnerable to attack from WTO
Members alleging that ACSA discriminates against their exports
to the United States, but that it does not meet the narrow GATT
Article XX tests permitting such trade discrimination.34
In the most recent relevant case, involving a Brazilian ban
on imports of retreaded tires, the WTO Appellate Body found
that, while Brazil’s import ban constituted a permissible means
of protecting human health, the fact that Brazil also permitted
imports of retreaded tires from neighboring MERCOSUR countries resulted in trade discrimination not rationally connected to
the human health objective of the import ban.35 Because of this
Winter 2008

absence of a rational connection between the objective of the
import ban and the manner in which it was applied, the import
ban did not satisfy the narrow GATT Article XX test. This most
recent WTO decision—in particular the rational connection test
applied by the WTO Appellate Body—provides an important
roadmap for U.S. lawmakers crafting climate change legislation,
but by no means answers whether ACSA or other such legislation, once implemented, would pass the GATT Article XX
test if challenged. As noted in the congressional White Paper
discussed above, “while Congress has control over which traderelated measure to include in a climate bill, the determination of
such a provision’s legitimacy under WTO rules is out of U.S.
hands.”36
The retaliation issue matters, because a loss at the WTO
could mean the conferral on U.S. trading partners of substantial retaliation rights. Previously stung by WTO losses providing substantial retaliation rights to the complaining WTO
Members,37 U.S. law- and policy-makers are justifiably nervous
about the possible outcome of a WTO challenge to ACSA’s
import provisions.
ACSA’s import measures also are likely to re-activate the
longstanding debate about whether the WTO Agreements prohibit or allow trade regulation based on so-called processes and
production methods (“PPMs”). The basic terms of the debate can
be summarized in the following question: May WTO Members
regulate imports based on the way a good is made (i.e., PPMs),
or must WTO Members base such regulation on the physical
attributes of the good in the condition as imported? It is easy to
see why some might characterize ACSA’s import provisions as
PPMs, as their application arguably hinges on the “emissions
footprint” of the imported good, rather than its physical characteristics at the time the good crosses the border.
The WTO jurisprudence to date does not provide a definitive answer on the WTO-consistency of PPMs, and WTO experts
are divided on the question. One recent commentator assembled
a long list of statements supporting the view that PPMs can
never (or almost never) be justified under WTO rules, and then
proceeded to “debunk the myth of illegality.”38 The most commonly cited standards in WTO case law for analyzing PPMs are
in the multiple decisions in the Shrimp-Turtle Case, in which
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a U.S. ban
on the importation of shrimp caught in a manner that adversely
affected threatened sea turtles. These complaining WTO Members alleged, inter alia, that the ban violated the U.S. obligation under the WTO to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
imports from these countries.39 The U.S. defense turned on the
application of GATT Article XX, described above.
One aspect of the WTO Appellate Body’s ultimate decision
in the Shrimp-Turtle Case could be central to any future case
challenging ACSA’s import provisions as WTO-inconsistent
PPMs. In upholding a modified version of the U.S. import ban
as consistent with GATT Article XX, the WTO Appellate Body
concluded that a WTO Member can show that an import restriction does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” for purposes of GATT Article XX if that WTO Member
24

attempts to negotiate an international agreement ensuring equal
treatment of all affected trading partners. As the WTO Appellate Body explained, the key is not whether such an agreement
is actually reached, but whether the WTO Member asserting
a GATT Article XX defense has made a “serious, good faith
effort” to reach such agreement.40
Given the ongoing interplay of U.S. legislative efforts to
impose a national scheme to limit GHG emissions and the international UNFCCC process, it is too soon to say if the United
States would be able to rely on the “international negotiation”
defense of the Shrimp-Turtle Case. Notably, ACSA section
6003 would require the United States to engage in international
negotiations with the objective of coordinating global GHG
emissions reductions in a manner consistent with the goals of
ACSA. However, at this point we can only speculate if ACSA
will even be enacted into law.
The Bush Administration also expressed concern that import
restrictions like those proposed in ACSA pose trade policy problems beyond possible inconsistency with U.S. WTO obligations.
As recently expressed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan C.
Schwab, unilateral U.S. trade restrictions designed to compel
reductions in foreign emissions of GHGs are “a blunt and imprecise instrument of fear” that could poison commercial relations
and trigger retaliatory measures by U.S. trading partners.41 Such
mirror actions could quickly harm U.S. exports, and could take
years to resolve if challenged at the WTO.42
Rather, the consistent message from U.S. Trade Representative Schwab has been that, instead of crafting import restrictions
that will somehow ensure a competitive, level playing field as
countries commit to GHG reductions, the priority of the United
States should be to harness trade liberalization to enhance the
global distribution of goods and services that contribute to climate change mitigation. At the core of this effort are the ongoing
WTO negotiations toward an Agreement on Trade in Environmental Goods and Services (“EGSA”).43 The mandate for these
negotiations, set out in the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration,44 is
the “reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to environmental goods and services.”45 When
originally conceived, this mandate did not expressly include climate change. Nor did the mandate provide any guidance on what
goods and services should be deemed “environmental.” But the
United States and many other WTO Members now view a multilateral EGSA as an important tool in combating climate change,
and state that this effort complements the UNFCCC process. As
recently explained by U.S. Trade Representative Schwab, the
current framework for such an agreement, as jointly proposed
by the United States and the EU, would increase global trade in
climate-friendly technologies (such as wind turbines and photovoltaic solar panels) by as much as fourteen percent, thereby
contributing significantly to global reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions.46
As of this writing, the Administration and Congress appear
to be headed for a show-down this year on ACSA’s import provisions. As a practical matter, the debate seems likely to carry
forward into a new Congress and Administration in 2009.
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ACSA and U.S. Trade Remedy Law
Notwithstanding the possibility of claims that ACSA’s carbon leakage provisions may violate U.S. WTO obligations and
send signals to U.S. trading partners inconsistent with current
U.S. trade policy, the carbon leakage provisions may also be
viewed as consistent in spirit with long-accepted norms under
U.S. trade remedy laws.
Like many WTO Members, the United States maintains
antidumping and countervailing duty laws that permit domestic
industries to petition the government (or allow the government
on its own initiative) to impose import duties to redress injurious import practices. Under the U.S. antidumping law, the U.S.
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) may order CBP to impose
on imports antidumping duties in an amount equivalent to the
difference between the actual import values, as adjusted under
the statute, and their deemed “fair value.”47 Similarly, under the
U.S. countervailing duty law, DOC may impose duties to offset
subsidies provided by foreign governments to the extent they
confer an unfair benefit on imports and certain other conditions
are satisfied.48 These laws are expressly permitted by WTO
rules,49 and are widely seen as a necessary escape clause from
the presumption of trade liberalization that permitted the WTO
Agreements to be reached in the first place.50
The trade-restrictive provisions of ACSA may be seen as
expanding the universe of import practices that should be deemed
“unfair” under U.S. law. As noted, international trade law, as
reflected in both U.S. domestic law and the WTO system, recognizes that import pricing below certain levels (whether due to
“dumping” by foreign exporters or subsidies provided by foreign
governments) is a form of unfair trade that, when causing harm
to domestic industries, may be redressed through import duties.
This notion of unfair trade is based purely on how an imported
product is priced. ACSA would arguably expand this accepted
notion of unfair trade to take into account how imported products are made—specifically, the volume and nature of the GHGs
associated with their manufacture. ACSA would, in essence,
dictate that the price of U.S. imports reflects the externalized
environmental costs of GHG emissions. Just as the U.S. antidumping law provides a remedy to domestic manufacturers that
must compete against unfairly low-priced, or “dumped,” imports,
ACSA would provide a remedy to domestic manufacturers that
must compete against imports that were manufactured under less
stringent GHG emissions standards—in other words, a remedy
against a newly recognized form of environmental dumping.
However, unlike the U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty laws—which cover approximately one percent of the total
value of U.S. imports—ACSA could potentially apply to a very
substantial percentage of U.S. imports. As explained above,
“covered goods” under ACSA include iron, steel, aluminum,
cement, bulk glass, and paper, as well as many other unspecified manufactured goods accounting for “comparable” levels of
greenhouse gas emissions.51 Thus, ACSA (or any comparable
legislation to equalize the climate change impact of imports with
domestically produced goods) could represent a major expanSustainable Development Law & Policy

sion of the concept of “unfair trade.” Still, the core concept of
ACSA’s trade provisions are analogous to U.S. trade remedy
law in that their purpose is to equalize the competitive impact
of imports with the same types of goods produced domestically
through recognition of an “unfair” advantage conferred on the
imports.

Conclusion
The political will to sharply reduce GHG emissions—at
least in the United States and the EU—seems to be strong and
intensifying. The major U.S. presidential candidates all support the implementation of a national cap-and-trade system to
reduce greenhouse gases, and all support U.S. participation in
the UNFCCC process. Senator Baucus has spoken of “the moral
imperative to deal with climate change.”52 Further, the introduction of ACSA by Senators Lieberman and Warner signals a
bipartisan consensus for ambitious action on climate change.
However, the “carbon leakage” problem that ACSA’s trade
provisions attempt to address—a critical component of the
bill from the perspective of U.S. GHG-emitting manufacturing industries—may also constitute a major hurdle to ACSA’s
enactment into law. For one, there seems to be significant risk
that ACSA’s trade provisions, if enacted, could trigger WTO
complaints against the United States and, potentially, retaliatory action to the detriment of U.S. exporters. This risk is one
reason the current Administration is wary of proposals to penalize importers of GHG-intensive goods, and is instead promoting
other mechanisms, such as a multilateral EGSA, that would rely
upon trade liberalization, rather than trade restriction, to combat climate change. However, these objections to ACSA’s trade
provisions cannot be expected to lessen the concerns of U.S.
GHG-intensive manufacturing industries which, absent such
provisions, would likely face declining competitiveness vis-àvis their foreign rivals not subject to GHG emissions restrictions
of the same magnitude as imposed in the United States. These
U.S. industries can be expected to press for equalizing measures,

akin to the trade remedy laws, to ensure “fair” competition with
imported goods manufactured under less stringent GHG emissions standards.
The controversy surrounding ACSA’s trade provisions also
underscores the imbalance between U.S. domestic and multilateral efforts to reduce GHG emissions. GHG emissions and
climate change are a problem of the “global commons,” and
therefore require a globally coordinated approach as embodied
in the UNFCCC process and Bali Roadmap. Yet, as explained
above, the Bali Action Plan does not expressly commit developing countries to undertake reduction in GHG emissions. In
the face of this asymmetry of commitments between developed and developing countries, it is reasonable to expect the
United States (and the EU) to explore domestic laws and other
mechanisms that would unilaterally attempt to compel countries
with less stringent GHG emissions standards to tighten them.
That is what ACSA seeks to do—first through a mandate for
the Executive Branch to negotiate a global agreement to reduce
GHG emissions in a coordinated fashion, and second, through
import requirements that would redress any competitive imbalance experienced by foreign manufacturing industries exporting
to the United States.
It remains unclear how much of the burden developing
countries will accept as the Bali Roadmap process produces a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (if it does). But it is clear that,
the less they do, the greater will be the pressure on U.S. and
EU lawmakers to ensure, through unilateral trade measures like
ACSA’s import provisions, that their industries are protected
from imports produced under less costly emissions standards.
Political realism suggests that trade mechanisms will be tools of
choice in this effort—whether or not they are found to comply
with current WTO rules, the Administration’s trade policy preferences, or the “shared vision” principles espoused in the Bali
Action Plan.
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